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Recent Decisions

LABOR LAW-RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

IN EMPLOYMENT-RECONCILIA-

TION OF THE POLICIES OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866-The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that an action seeking relief from racial discrimination by a private employer based on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is not
impliedly barred by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Young v. International Telephone and Telegraph Company, 438
F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
Young, a black union member, brought an action seeking damages and
injunctive relief in a federal district court for alleged racial discrimination by his employer and union. The complaint asserted subject matter
jurisdiction under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,1 now 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.2 This section gives all persons regardless of
race the same right to contract. The complaint did not allege that any
action was initiated pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19643 which proscribes discriminatory practices by employers and
unions on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. The
district court dismissed the complaint, holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
does not apply to private acts of discrimination, and that the plaintiff's
failure to have invoked the administrative processes outlined in Title
VII before seeking judicial relief was fatal to his action. 4 The court of
appeals reversed the district court's decision.
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company,' the Supreme Court held
that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was intended to bar all discrimination, public or
private, in the sale or rental of property. The court of appeals in
Young first traced the origin of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to section 1 of the
1866 statute, and in view of Jones held that 442 U.S.C. § 1981 is applicable to private acts of discrimination in the making and enforcing
of employment contracts. 6 Two other circuits had previously arrived at a
1. Act of 9 April, 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970). Section 1981 provides: "All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens."
3. §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
4. 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
9536 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

5.

392 U.S. 409 (1968).

6.

Young v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971). A further develop-

ment in the area of applying post Civil War legislation to current problems occurred in
Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In that case, the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1970), which is based on section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and affords a

civil remedy for a conspiracy to deprive an individual of the equal protection of the laws,
was held applicable to conspiracies among private individuals.
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similar conclusion. 7 The court then investigated the possibility of Title
VII impliedly repealing 42 U.S.C. § 1981.8 Since Congress had no
knowledge at the time of Title VII's enactment that private discrimination was prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, there could have been no
intentional or express repealer. The court looked to the two categories
of repeals by implication as set down in Posadas v. National City Bank9
which are-(l) if the latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute; and (2) where provisions in
the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the latter act to the extent of
the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. 10
The first category of repeals by implication was readily held inapplicable because with respect to employers and other contract rights, Title
VII coverage was more limited than 42 U.S.C. § 1981.11 The court then
discussed possible conflicting provisions between the two statutes raised
by the defendants which include the duty of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to temporarily defer to state agencies, 12 the thirty day statute of limitations contained in Title VII,"3 and

14
the duty of the EEOC to attempt conciliation.
The duty of the EEOC to temporarily defer to state and local agencies
was found to be indicative of an intention by Congress to take advantage
of existing state agencies having experience and expertise, thus shielding
the EEOC from an overburdening case load, and not indicative of an
intention to deprive any appropriate forums of their jurisdiction.' 5 The
difference in statutes of limitation was attributed to the different govern7. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
8. The Court in Jones faced an analogous issue with respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, §§ 801-831, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970),
and held that the latter act does not pre-empt any remedy under the former act. In
Sanders and Waters, the courts relied on the analogy and concluded that the same
result should be reached in the Title VII context. The decision in Jones, however, was
only dictum because the petitioners there could not have brought an action under Title
VIII since their claims accrued prior to the effective date of Title VIII. 392 U.S. at 417,
n.21. Furthermore, Title VIII was passed with a savings clause indicating it was not intended to affect any other state or federal remedy.
9. 296 U.S. 497 (1936).
10. Id. at 503.
11. Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970) limits Title VII's application to
employers in interstate commerce having over twenty-five employees. Also, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 is applicable to contracts other than employment contracts.
12. Title VII § 706(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c) (1970).
13. Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970). The complainant has thirty days
after being notified of the EEOC's inability to conciliate his claim to file suit in a federal
district court.
14. Title VII § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(a) (1970).
15. 438 F.2d at 762.
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mental and judicial interests involved in a suit under Title VII, and was
held not to be evidence of irreconcilable conflict. 16
The statutory duty of the EEOC to attempt conciliation presented a
more complex issue, and was the strongest argument facing the court
in favor of implied repeal. Upon reviewing the available legislative
history, the court found no reference to any limitation on the jurisdiction of other agencies due to the enactment of Title VII.Y The court
further stated that case law exists which recognizes a concurrent juris8
diction between the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board,'
and concluded that nothing in the language of Title VII casts doubt on
the validity of these holdings or indicates an intention to deprive a
district court of any pre-existing jurisdiction, known or unknown. 9
The legislative history of Title VII reveals that the procedural
mechanisms initially advanced for attacking discrimination in employment were modified to a great extent as the bill proceeded through
Congress.20 The statute emerged with the primary responsibility of
initiating and prosecuting a claim upon the aggrieved individual since
the EEOC lacked investigative or enforcement powers. Conciliation by
the EEOC was the statutory method enacted to resolve disputes, with the
employee retaining the right to sue in a federal court if the EEOC efforts were unsuccessful. 21 Ideally, conciliation in the field of labormanagement relations has many advantages which include: settling
disputes while minimizing friction between the employer and employee,
giving the employer a chance to explain his conduct before widespread
public attention, and allowing broad relief to the employee without the
expenses of litigation. 22 The conciliation efforts by the EEOC, however,
have been unsuccessful in approximately half the cases during the last
16. Id. at 763. Different governmental interests include the broader coverage of Title
VII with respect to employers, and the possibility of participation in the lawsuit by the
United States Attorney General. Different judicial interests include the possibility of waiver
of fees and costs, the imposition of counsel fees, and the appointment of counsel for the
complainant. Id.
17. Id. at 762. It was pointed out that Senator Tower introduced an amendment which
would have excluded any federal agency but the EEOC from dealing with practices
covered by Title VII. That amendment was defeated by more than a 2-1 margin. See
110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964).
18. United Packinghouse Food and Allied Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); Local Union No. 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d
12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
19. 438 F.2d at 762.
20. See Vass, Legislative History of Title VII, 7 B.C. IND. AND COM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
21. Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(e) (1970).
22. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1200 (1971).
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four years.23 The Commission's lack of enforcement power eases the
pressure to conciliate on the employer.2 4 Recent case law has recognized
this weakness and has favored judicial redressing of employee grievances
over strict adherence to a statutory policy of conciliation. For example,
the federal courts have allowed actions to proceed under Title VII in
which the EEOC had not attempted conciliation, 25 had found that no
"reasonable cause" for complaint existed 2 6 and had proposed reasonable
27
conciliatory solutions which the charging party refused to accept.
From these cases, it is apparent that a complainant proceeding under
Title VII will not be barred from the federal courts regardless of the
outcome of the EEOC's conciliatory efforts. The courts, however, have
been unwilling to allow suit directly in a federal court under Title VII
without affording the EEOC at least the opportunity to conciliate. It
has been held repeatedly that completely bypassing the EEOC would
fly in the face of clear congressional intent and nullify the statute's
28
conciliation policy.
Prior to Young, two actions seeking relief from racial discrimination
based solely on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 had reached federal appellate courts. In
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co.,29 the Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that exhaustion of Title
VII procedures prior to the initiation of a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
was not required if the plaintiff pleads a reasonable excuse for bypassing these procedures. In Sanders v. Dobbs,ao the plaintiff had failed
to commence a suit within Title VII's statutory time limit of thirty
days after notification that the EEOC could not conciliate her claims,8 1
23.

Id.

24. See Comment, Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil
Rights Act: How About Cease and Desist Powers? 9 DuQ. L. REv. 75 (1970).

25. Dent v. St. Louis-S.F, Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
26. Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v. United States
Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
27. Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
28. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382
F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968); See also Developments in the
Law, supra note 22 at 1202, n.46.
29. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). The defendants in Young
urged the court to accept Waters as holding that either exhaustion of Title VII remedies
or some justification for non-exhaustion is a jurisdictional pre-requisite in a racial discrimination suit. This contention was summarily rejected by the court. 438 F.2d at 762.
30. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). This case overruled
Harrison v. American Can Co. 61 CCH Lab. Cas.
9353 (S.D. Ala. 1969) which was relied
on by the district court. Harrison held that the comprehensive scheme for handling employment discrimination contained in Title VII evidenced a clear intent of Congress
that Title VII processes must first be utilized before seeking judicial relief.
31. Title VII § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
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and brought an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit sustained the action, rejecting the defendant's
contention that Title VII impliedly repealed 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
It is significant, however, that none of the courts in actions based on
Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 have permitted an unexcused bypass of
Title VII's elaborate procedural scheme. Even in Sanders, the plaintiff
had initially proceeded through the EEOC but inadvertently failed to
bring suit within the statutory time limit and was forced to base her
action on 42 U.S.C. § 1981.82 In this respect, Young differs from the
previous line of cases, and raises a question concerning the viability of
Title VII's procedural scheme in racial discrimination cases now that a
plaintiff has an independent basis of relief. 33
It is submitted that the Young decision is unlikely to have the
practical effect of rendering the procedural scheme of Title VII a
nullity. Few bona fide cases seeking other than temporary injunctive
relief will be initiated in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This
is due to various factors including: the relative ease of filing a complaint
with the EEOC, the expense associated with initiating a federal law suit,
and the likelihood of obtaining at least partial satisfaction of a claim
under conciliation initiated by a local agency or the EEOC.

4

This is

not to say that the decision will have little beneficial effect. As pointed
out by the court, an employer may be more willing to settle with an
employee while a preliminary injunction has preserved the status quo.3 5
Furthermore, in many situations, such as the discriminatory firing of an
employee, temporary relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction is
essential for providing a meaningful remedy to the aggrieved employee.
A considerable time delay will diminish the value of any award to the
employee, and may even discourage his seeking any relief under Title
VII. The decision of the court, in this respect, has eliminated a major
weakness in the procedural scheme for eliminating racial discrimination in employment promulgated by Title VII.
Notwithstanding this desirable effect, it is submitted that the court's
32. Furthermore, in Sanders, the defendant had not pointed out specific conflicting
provisions in the two statutes, but had argued generally concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1981's
implied repeal. The court, therefore, never decided the specific issue of whether the
EEOC's duty to conciliate was in conflict with an independent remedy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
33. For discrimination on any basis other than race, Title VII remains the only
remedy.
34. Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 640 (1968-69).
35. 438 F.2d at 764.
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decision that a plaintiff can intentionally bypass the EEOC and proceed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was neither intended by Congress in light of
the detailed procedural scheme of Title VII, nor warranted by the
application of subsequent case law. It is further submitted that an alternative to the holding in Young, which retains substantially all of its
beneficial effects, is to limit the relief available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
to a preliminary injunction. The granting of this relief could be withheld until a complaint is filed with the EEOC, and thus a sharp break
with previous case law which emphasized the requirement of initially
proceeding within the procedural scheme of Title VII would be
avoided.
Preliminary injunctive relief should not be precluded by Title VII,
since the language of the statute does not explicitly deny the granting of
this relief, and the legislative history is silent on the matter.3 6 Also, since
a preliminary injunction should render the conciliation efforts more
successful, this type of relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 would not be irreconcilable with the procedural scheme of Title VII, but on the contrary in harmony with the statute's policies. Furthermore, the possibility
of harassment of employers by groundless suits would be eliminated.
The plaintiff could not gain affirmative relief before filing a charge with
the EEOC, but only preserve the status quo of the parties.
Precedent abounds which recognizes the importance of allowing a
federal court to assume jurisdiction in a course of action without explicit
statutory authority, in order to preserve the status quo pending an
administrative determination of the merits of the complaint.37 Among
the more significant cases in this category is West India Fruit and
Steamship Company v. Seatrain Lines.38 The second circuit affirmed a
district court's decision to grant an injunction restraining certain shipping rate reductions pending a final decision by the United States
Maritime Commission. The Commission had exclusive jurisdiction in
the controversy, and express statutory authority allowing the court to
interfere did not exist. This precedent would especially apply to the
present case since the final determination of the rights of the parties lies
in the federal courts rather than in the EEOC, and explicit statutory
authority for the court's jurisdiction exists.
36. Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1257.
37. See JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 677-86 (1965) and cases
cited therein.
38. 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948), petition for cert. dismissed on petitioner's motion, 336
U.S. 908 (1949).
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A situation in which relief of this nature is especially valuable would
be the discriminatory firing of an employee. The court could bar firing
or allow the complainant to receive his salary during the injunctive
period. 0 In other situations, such as discriminatory hiring practices in a
new construction project, the court may enjoin the start of the project. 40
It is unlikely that a court would properly order the hiring of a new
employee not chosen by the employer, however, if the employer is a
41
repeated violator of Title VII, this remedy may be appropriate.
The Young case marks the limit to which the federal courts can assure
more meaningful remedies for discriminatory employment practices
under the present statutory scheme. The remaining obstacles to a more
effective anti-discrimination policy including the EEOC's lack of enforcement and investigative powers can only be changed by further
legislation. Congress has refused on many occasions to act upon bills
incorporating these changes, 42 and the judiciary has assumed the initiative of liberalizing the procedural scheme of Title VII. Now it is time
that Congress once more assume the responsibility for further alleviating
discriminatory practices in employment by passing legislation correcting
the inherent weaknesses of Title VII's procedural scheme.
Mark Joseph Zovko, Jr.

CONFLICT

OF

LAwS-CHOICE

OF

LAW

IN

INTERSPOUSAL

SUITs-The

United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in an action
by a woman against her former husband for injuries arising out of an
automobile accident, the law of the state of the accident rather than the
law of the state of domicile would be controlling on the issue of interspousal immunity.
Purcell v. Kapelski, 444 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1971).
Elizabeth Kapelski, a passenger in a car driven by her husband, sustained injuries in a two-car collision at a New Jersey intersection near
the Pennsylvania border. At the time of the accident, they were both
Pennsylvania domiciliaries. Subsequently, the couple was divorced and
Developments in the Law, supra note 22, at 1259.
40, Id. at 1259.
41. Id.
42. See Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural Elucidation, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 30 (1969-70).
39.
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